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This paper employs a new mean-standard deviation utility (MSU) function with
more general properties than traditionally employed function in the agricultural
economics literature to explore the risk preferences of Irish barley producers
between 1988 and 1997. During this period EU cereal producers were subject
to major policy reforms (MacSharry Reforms) that may have inﬂuenced the
nature of producers’ risk attitudes. Our ﬁndings support the proposed function
in preference to the Linear Mean Variance (LMV) function. We ﬁnd that Irish
cereal producers are highly risk averse but their degree of risk aversion falls
appreciably in the period before and following the MacSharry Reforms. We
also ﬁnd that the majority of Irish producers exhibit increasing absolute risk
aversion (IARA) but the proportion displaying DARA increases substantially
following the 1992Reforms. The policy implications of our results are discussed.1 Introduction
In this paper we apply a mean standard-deviation utility (MSU) function, which has
more desirable properties than the typical function that is used in the agricultural
economics literature, to determine the behaviour towards risk of specialist Irish
barley producers. We examine this issue over the period 1988 to 1997. This period
covers two developments in European agricultural policy that could potentially have
aﬀected producers’ risk attitudes, namely, the introduction of partially decoupled
direct payments under the MacSharry CAP Reforms in 1992 and the progressive
liberalisation of cereal prices that has been in place now for several years and which
was given an additional momentum by the MacSharry Reforms.
Our paper has three main motivations. Sandmo (1971), in a well-known paper,
showed that the structure of risk preferences is of crucial importance in determin-
ing whether the introduction of, or an increase in, a lump-sum subsidy (such as
the 1992 direct payments) has a positive or negative impact on the supply respon-
siveness of producers. Speciﬁcally, he shows that where decreasing absolute risk
aversion (DARA) prevails then an increase in direct payments leads to a reduction
in output. On the other hand, if increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) holds,
then an increase in direct payments reduces output, while constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) implies that changes in direct payments are unrelated to changes
in output. It appears to us to be important that the MSU functions that are used
in empirical applications be suﬃciently ﬂexible to allow any given data set to deter-
mine the structure of risk preferences. However, most applications in agricultural
economics restrict the MSU function a priori to be of the CARA or DARA classes.
In the context of the growing importance of direct payments in the income and
wealth of EU farmers and the debate around the decoupled nature of these direct
payments, the nature of producers’ attitude towards risk thus assumes a particu-
lar signiﬁcance. Hence our ﬁrst motivation was to establish the risk preferences of
producers with a utility function that was suﬃciently ﬂexible to allow for the three
diﬀerent types of risk aversion, namely, DARA, IARA or CARA. Our second moti-
vation was to establish whether the MacSharry 1992 reforms had impacted on the
structure or degree of risk preferences themselves. We achieve this by exploring at-
titudes towards risk before and after the 1992 policy change. A ﬁnal motivation was
to uncover whether producers might be interested in purchasing insurance products
3or similar hedging instruments to any signiﬁcant degree. Their preference for such
products will be inﬂuenced by their attitude towards risk and its degree and also
by their relationship towards risk at diﬀerent levels of income.
Several studies have examined the production eﬀects of the 1992 MacSharry and
1999 Agenda 2000 reforms of the EU Commmon Agricultural Policy (CAP) Cereal
Regime, (see, for example, Moro and Sckokai (1999), OudeLansink and Peerlings
(1996) and Guyomard et al (1996)). Comparatively few investigations, however,
have incorporated producers’ risk attitudes, (see, for example, Anton and LeMouel
(2002), Sckokai and Moroa (2002), OudeLansink (1999) and Boyle and McQuinn
(2001)). This study is a further application in this genre.
The paper is laid out as follows: the next section presents an integrated model
of production technology and risk behaviour. The data for the empirical application
to specialist Irish cereal producers are next discussed. The results of estimating the
model are then presented and interpreted. A ﬁnal section oﬀers some concluding
comments and proﬀers some implications.
2 A Production Model in the Presence of Risk
2.1 Modelling producers’ risk behaviour - introducing a new MSU
function
In this paper we derive a new MSU function, denoted by V ( ,σ), where   is the
mean of the random variable and σ is its standard deviation, by directly generating
the expected utility of income given assumptions about the utility of farm income
function and the distribution of farm income.1
A range of assumptions about both the utility function and the distribution
of income is possible. In deriving our proposed function we assume a concave
CRRA utility function but, crucially, we do not restrict the nature of absolute risk
aversion. We also assume that farm income is distributed as a log normal. This
distribution is among the more tractable and plausible distributions that could be
1This approach contrasts, for example, with that of Saha (1997) and Nelson and Escalante
(2004) who proceed by specifying MSU functions without explicitly deﬁning either the underlying
function or the distribution of farm income.
4used to model farm income. We contrast the empirical results obtained for this
model with the more restrictive linear-mean-variance (LMV) MSU function, which
implies the more restrictive CARA utility function and where random income is
assumed to be normally distributed.
Suppose farm income (y) has a Log Normal distribution. It is conventional to
write its parameters as  ∗ and σ∗, where, these are the mean and standard deviation
of the Normal distribution of log y. Then, as is shown in any standard statistical
textbook, the mean and variance of y are









Expressing  ∗ and σ∗ in terms of   and σ gives


















We now employ the utility function
U(y) = 1 − λe−λ log y or U(z) = 1 − λe−λz, (5)
where z = log y and where λ is > −1. As is easily veriﬁed
V ( ∗,σ∗) = E[U(z)] =
Z
U(z)f(y, ∗,σ∗)dy = 1 − λe−λµ∗+ 1
2λ2σ∗2
(6)
5Substituting (3) and (4) gives our MSU function as
V ( ,σ) = 1 − λe−λ logµ+ λ
2 (λ+1)log(1+σ2/µ2) (7)
It can be easily shown that V is concave provided  2 > (λ + 2)σ2, which implies




VµµVσσ − (Vµσ)2 ≥ 0
where, Vµ, Vσ denote the partial derivatives of V with respect to   and σ and Vµµ,
Vσσ and Vµσ are the corresponding second derivatives.
Given these conditions then it is well known that there is an exact correspon-
dence between the measures of risk aversion derived from U(y) and V ( ,σ) (see,
for example, Eichner and Wagener (2005)). Speciﬁcally, the Marginal Rate of Sub-
stitution between σ and  , that is, S = −(Vσ/Vµ), corresponds to the Arrow-Pratt
measure of Absolute Risk Aversion (ARA). Also the partial derivative of S with
respect to   indicates the nature of ARA, speciﬁcally, if, Sµ < 0 (DARA);if Sµ = 0
(CARA) and if Sµ > 0 (IARA). Similarly, if we increase   and σ by the same
multiple t, then the partial derivates of S with respect to t indicates the nature of
relative risk aversion or RRA. Thus, St < 0 implies decreasing relative risk aversion
(DRRA); St = 0 gives constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and St > 0 gives
increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA).
From (7) we have
Vµ = (1 − V )
λ
 
[ 2 + (λ + 2)σ2]
 2 + σ2 (9)
6Vσ = −(1 − V )
λ(1 + λ)σ
 2 + σ2 (10)
The Arrow-Pratt measure of ARA is, thus, given by
S =
(1 + λ) σ
 2 + (λ + 2)σ2 (11)




[(λ + 2)σ2 −  2]
[ 2 + (λ + 2)σ2]
(12)
This is a particularly interesting expression. Once income becomes large enough,
decreasing absolute risk aversion or DARA must hold. However, it could be positive,
implying IARA, for low mean income (or high λ and variance). Speciﬁcally, (12) will
imply: CARA if   = σ
√
λ + 2; IARA if   < σ
√
λ + 2; and DARA if   > σ
√
λ + 2.
It can also be easily shown that if σ and   are both increased by a multiple t,
then St = 0, implying that the function satisﬁes Constant Relative Risk Aversion
or CRRA.
Thus, our proposed MSU function is capable of encompassing DARA, IARA
and CARA structures and one does not have to impose a particular structure on
a given dataset a priori. We benchmark our model against the so-called linear
mean-variance MSU function deﬁned by






This function, as noted by Nelson and Escalante (2004), has been widely em-
ployed in the agricultural economics literature. The function is obtained by taking
the expected utility of y, where U(y) = 1 − e−λy and y is assumed to be normally
distributed. Given the latter assumption together with the fact that (13) implies
CARA, it is apparent that the linear mean-variance function is highly restrictive.
7However, due to its widespread use in the literature it is useful to contrast the
implications of using this MSU function as against our less restrictive alternative.
The marginal rate of substitution (S) for the linear mean-variance model is
simply
S = λσ (14)
2.2 The producers’ choice problem
In this section of our paper we follow the seminal contribution of Sandmo (1971)
Irish specialist cereal producers are assumed to maximise the expected utility of
income with income deﬁned as follows
y = pq − c(q) − f + d + o (15)
where: y is annual income; p and q are prices and outputs respectively; c(q) are
the allocable costs to barley; f denotes non-allocatable ﬁxed costs; d are Direct
Payments; and o denotes ‘other’ income which includes income from other farming
activity, oﬀ-farm household income and income deriving from non-farm assets.
We assume that the only source of randomness that aﬀects the optimal level of
(non-stochastic) q, derives from random prices p. These assumptions imply that
  =  p − c(q) − f + d + o (16)
σ = σpq
where:  p and σp denote the mean and standard deviation of the random barley
price.
Producers are assumed to maximise V ( ,σ) where   and σ are given by (16) by
choosing the level of q. It can easily be shown that the ﬁrst-order condition for a
8maximum is given by
 p − c′(q) = Sσp (17)
where: c′(q) denotes the marginal cost of production.
We substitute (11) for S in (17) to obtain the central equation of our model.
We contrast the results obtained from this model with the results generated by the
traditional linear mean-variance model which is obtained by substituting (14) for S
in (17).
We complete the model by specifying cost and production functions that are
assumed to be of the Cobb-Douglas form. Thus, the complete empirical model is
given by
(i) log q = log(a0) +
5 X
j=1
ajlog(xj) + ǫ (18)




(iii) log( p − (1/a1)(c(q)/q)) = log(Sσp) + η
where: the x’s are production inputs, x1 = allocatable (variable) inputs (fertilisers,
crop protection and other inputs), x2 = (quasi-ﬁxed) labour inputs, x3 = (quasi-
ﬁxed) capital inputs, x4 = (quasi-ﬁxed) land area and x5 = an indicator of soil
quality; the a’s are production/cost parameters to be estimated; w1 denotes the
price of allocatable (variable) inputs and ǫ, ξ and η are error terms.
2.3 Some useful comparative statics
While Sandmo (1971) has derived the comparative statics in the general case, it is
useful to derive some of the key comparative statics results for our particular system.
The key results are obtained by totally diﬀerentiating the ﬁrst-order condition in
(18)(iii). Denoting the partial derivatives of (18)(iii) by f(...) some of the key
comparative static results may be shown to be obtained as follows





(λ + 2)σ2 −  2
 2 + (λ + 2)σ2
￿
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￿
(iii) fσp = −2S
￿
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 2 + (λ + 2)σ2
￿
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where: c′′(q) denotes the second derivative of cost with respect to output.
The sign of the supply response eﬀects (expressions (19(v)−19(vii)) depend on
the signs of the partial derivatives. With the exception of the partial derivative of
the standard deviation of price (19(iii)), which is unambiguously negative in sign,
the signs of the remaining derivatives depend on the structure of risk aversion. It
is apparent that their signs depend on the relative magnitudes of  2 and (λ + 2)σ2
and, as noted previously, if  2 < σ2(λ + 2) IARA is implied, while DARA holds
if  2 > σ2(λ + 2). If  2 = σ2(λ + 2), then CARA holds and the expressions are
considerably simpliﬁed. If IARA holds we can see that fµ will be negative, as
will fq, provided −c′′(q) exceeds the second expression in (19(iv)) which will be
positive under IARA. It follows then that an increase in expected income brought
about by an increase in decoupled direct payments will cause output to fall, ceteris
paribus, under IARA but to increase under DARA. Irrespective of whether DARA
or IARA holds, it is apparent that an increase in the standard deviation of price
will always lead to a fall in output, ceteris paribus. It is apparent, however, that the
responsiveness of output will be lower under DARA than IARA. It is also evident
that output responds positively to a change in expected price under both DARA
and IARA. It is interesting to note, however, that we cannot determine whether
10the degree of output-price responsiveness will be higher or lower under DARA or
IARA since the numerator and denominator of expression (19(v)) will be aﬀected
in opposite directions.
3 Data Generation
The data used for the analysis are obtained from the Irish National Farm Survey
(NFS) conducted by Teagasc2. The survey is conducted annually and is based on
a representative sample of Irish farms and is used as the Irish input into the Farm
Accounts Data Network of the EU.3
The data available for our analysis spanned the years 1988 to 1997. As farms can
be surveyed over several years, we decided to exploit this feature by constructing
balanced-panel data sets. We formed separate panels for the period 1988-1992,
comprising 63 producers and for the period 1993-1997, comprising 41 producers.
This allows us to estimate our model for the period before and after the MacSharry
reforms. The selected panels were conﬁned to specialist barley producers. Barley
production is the single largest grain produced in Irish agriculture (between 1997
and 2002, the total area of barley accounted for, on average, 65 per cent of total
cereals grown).4
The prices for all input items are considered to be non-stochastic and known
to producers in advance of the input-application decision. Both output and input
prices are assumed to be constant across space and variable only through time.
This assumption is particularly valid in an Irish context as most cereal production
is located within a relatively small geographical area. The prices used for inputs are
national aggregate price indices as produced by the Irish Central Statistics Oﬃce.
2The Irish Agriculture and Food Development Authority
3For more on the NFS see Heavey et al. (1998).
4The deﬁnition ‘specialist’ is based on the EU’s farm classiﬁcation system as described in Com-
mission Decision 85/377/EEC. A producer is deemed to be a specialist cereal producer if more
than two thirds of the standard gross margin on the farm comes from cereal production.
113.1 Generating the expected value and variance of Irish barley
prices
A novel feature of the empirical model that we estimate is the price expectations
model used to generate the expected mean, variance and covariance of Irish grain
prices.5 We draw on the model of grain prices proposed by Roche and McQuinn
(2003). Only a brief outline of their model will be given here.
Most studies of price uncertainty follow the Chavas and Holt (1990) model.
Roche and McQuinn (2003) hypothesise a long-run relationship between Irish and
UK grain prices and model expected variances and covariances within an ARCH
framework. They explicitly test the forecasting performance of their model against
the Chavas and Holt approach using standard forecast statistics (the mean squared
error (MSE) and the mean absolute deviation (MAD)) as well as the recent test of
“superior predictive ability” (SPA) produced by Hansen (2001). In all cases, the
Roche and McQuinn (2003) model outperforms the Chavas-Holt speciﬁcation. The
model in its error correction form is expressed as
△ bir
pt = α0 + α1(pbir
t−1 − β1pbuk







[ut] ∼ N (0,ht)
The series pbir is the price of Irish feed barley, pbuk is the price of British feed barley
and u is a stochastic error terms. The conditional variance of Irish barley prices, ht
is estimated as an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH(1,1)) model.
The use of the results from the ARCH model have a number of attractive fea-
tures. First, the error correction model captures the dynamic nature of price trans-
missions between the mean Irish cereal prices and that of its largest grain trading
partner. Second, allowing for ARCH errors has been shown to improve the eﬃ-
ciency of the results achieved in such a transmission framework (see Bollerslev et
al. (1992) for example). The model is estimated on a rolling basis and forecasts are
5Pagan and Ullah (1988), amongst others, raise issues regarding both estimation and inference
when using estimated results for expected prices and variances.
12generated for the sample period 1984-1998. We refer to this model as the “rational
price expectations” (RPE) model.
While some empirical evidence (see, for example, Chavas (2000)) suggests that
certain producers may adhere to simpler price-expectations’ mechanisms such as
na¨ ıve expectations, we favour the rational expectations’ model, that is, price ex-
pectations are, on average, informed exclusively by the underlying data-generating
process of domestic grain prices. The close relationship between UK and Irish
grain prices revealed by the Roche and McQuinn (2003) model is a common fea-
ture of supply-response analysis in an Irish context (see the FAPRI-Ireland models
of the Irish agricultural sector, for example, Binﬁeld et al. (2000) and Binﬁeld
et al. (2001)). The price-taking assumption which is routinely invoked in analy-
ses of a small open agri-economy such as Ireland’s is not accommodated within a
na¨ ıve-price-expectations’ model. However, as a sensitivity check on our results, we
also employ the following hybrid of the na¨ ıve expectations’ and Chavas-Holt (CH)
approaches
 bir
pt = ψ0 + ψ1pbir
t−1 + et (21)
















We label this model the “C&H na¨ ıve price expectations’ model” (CHNPE).
In Table 1 (insert Table 1 here) we provide summary statistics of the variables
used in the analysis.
Some of the more interesting features of these data are the substantial increase
that is revealed for the standard deviation of barley prices between the ﬁrst and
second periods of our analysis and the emergence of direct payments as a signiﬁcant
component of expected farm income subsequent to the MacSharry Reforms.
4 Estimation and Results
4.1 Speciﬁcation tests
Our preferred model speciﬁcation is given by equation (18), with  p and σp derived
from equation (20) and (21), that is, our RPE speciﬁcation and the Marginal Rate of
13Substitution between   and σ, that is S, given by equation (11). We benchmark this
model against two alternatives. First, we replace the expected value and standard
deviation of prices by equations (21) and (22), that is by the CHNPE speciﬁcation.
Second, we replace the Marginal Rate of Substitution between   and σ by that
implied by the linear mean-variance model (LMV).
The system (18) is modiﬁed in the estimation by the addition of farm-speciﬁc
intercepts to capture possible time-invariant eﬃciency diﬀerences across farms and
we also include a time dummy variable to capture inter-temporal eﬃciency changes
that may be common to all farms over the period of estimation. Thus, the pa-
rameters in (18) of our preferred and alternative speciﬁcations are estimated as a
ﬁxed-eﬀects-panel-data model. Because of the possible endogeneity of right-hand-
side variables, we also employ an instrumental variables estimator, using the price
of phosphates and plant protection products as instruments. Finally, to enhance
the eﬃciency properties of our estimates we allow for contemporaneous correlation
in the error terms of the three equations in (18).6 The system (18) is estimated for
two diﬀerent time-periods (1988-1992), (1993-1997) using a balanced panel in each
case.7
Before presenting the results for our preferred speciﬁcation, we ﬁrst report the
results of the speciﬁcation tests that we conducted in respect of the nature of price
expectations (that is, RPE vs. CHNPE) and the speciﬁcation of the MSU function
(that is, our proposed new MSU function vs. the LMV speciﬁcation). As the
alternative models cannot be obtained by parametric restrictions on the preferred
speciﬁcation we need to employ a non-nested speciﬁcation test. An appropriate
test for this exercise is the overlapping version of the Vuong (1989) test. This
is essentially a likelihood-ratio test, suitably normalised. A test value close to
zero would suggest that there was no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the preferred
speciﬁcation and the proposed alternatives. The results are given in Table 2 (insert
Table 2 here). The test results imply strong support for our preferred speciﬁcation
so we now proceed to discuss the detailed results obtained for this model.
6We use the non-linear three-stage systems estimator in WinRATS 6.00. The relevant programs
are available from the authors upon request.
7We could have obtained estimates for a balanced panel over the full period, 1988-1997, but
there were only 16 producers available.
144.2 Estimation results - all farms
The coeﬃcient estimates of the system in (18) are shown in Table 3 (insert Table 3
here). In terms of the standard input production parameters, all of the coeﬃcients
are signiﬁcant at the one per cent level. All of the production inputs, bar labour,
have the correct positive signs and are of a reasonable magnitude. This result is
common across both time-periods. The negative sign on labour could arise for
a number of reasons. First, the basic data on the labour input refer to labour
that is available for use on farms as opposed to what is actually employed. Thus
the negative sign may suggest that there is more (family) labour available than
is actually required on specialist Irish cereal farms. This may be reﬂected in the
higher than average oﬀ-farm employment activity among specialist cereal producers.
A second and related explanation of the negative coeﬃcient could be due to the fact
that cereal production is a highly mechanised activity and there is extensive use of
contract services on cereal farms.
An F-test on the coeﬃcients of the farm-speciﬁc dummy variables rejects the null
hypothesis of joint non-signiﬁcance. In Table 4 (insert Table 4 here) we report the
results of miss-speciﬁcation tests performed on the system. Both speciﬁcation tests
are for the null of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity in a ﬁxed eﬀects model
and are taken from Chapter 10 of Verbeek (2000). From the table it would appear
that the error processes in all estimations are ‘well-behaved’.
The highly signiﬁcant estimate of the risk coeﬃcient, λ, indicates that specialist
Irish cereal producers are risk averse. It is apparent that the estimate declines
considerably between the earlier and later period, that is, from 32764 for the 1988-
1992 period to 1108 for the 1993-1997 time period. Thus over the full period 1988-97
Irish barley producers appear to have become much less sensitive to a given degree
of price risk.
4.3 Estimation results for small (< 50 acres) and large (> 50 acres)
farms
We also estimated the system in (18) for small farms (<50 acres) and large farms
(>50 acres). Our primary interest was to ascertain whether there were signiﬁcant
diﬀerences in the attitudes towards risk between small scale and large-scale produc-
15ers. The results are presented in Table 5 (insert Table 5 here).
The production coeﬃcients are fairly similar across both farm categories and
relatively stable for the two time periods. However, there is a substantial diﬀer-
ence in the risk parameter for the ﬁrst-period estimates. Large farms have a risk
parameter that is only 54 per cent of the magnitude of smaller farms. However, in
the second period the magnitude of this parameter has fallen substantially for both
categories and the risk parameter is seen to be of a very similar magnitude for both
farm-size groups.
4.4 Some key comparative static results
Following our derivations in Section 2.3, we now consider the key comparative statics
of our estimated model. For ease of interpretation, we present the comparative
static ﬁndings in terms of elasticities, which are estimated at the sample means.
The ﬁndings are given in Table 6 (insert Table 6 here).
The elasticity of the marginal rate of substitution (S) with respect to changes
in expected farm income reveals that specialist Irish cereal producers exhibit IARA
in both periods, although the magnitude of the elasticity declines between the ﬁrst
period and the second. It’s also interesting to note that we do not ﬁnd any diﬀerence
in the elasticity values between large and small farms.
While DARA is often preferred as an assumed risk structure, the ﬁnding of
IARA is not uncommon in the literature, see, for example, Wolf and Pohlman
(1983) and Abdulkadri et al. (2003). From a policy perspective, the ﬁnding of
IARA suggests that the receipt post 1992 of direct payments by producers would
have had a negative impact on the production of barley. This is revealed by our
estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to changes in the level of direct
payments. These are zero in the ﬁrst period as there were no DPs but in the second
period the elasticities as estimated at the sample means are fairly large (ranging
from -0.13 to -0.19), bearing in mind that the direct payments are denominated in
nominal terms. Larger farms would also appear to have relatively lower elasticities
than smaller farms.
The elasticity of output with respect to the standard deviation of the barley price
is seen to increase signiﬁcantly from the ﬁrst to the second period. The elasticity
16is found to be much bigger for smaller farms in both periods, most notably in the
1988-92 period. The main reason for the increase in this elasticity in the second
period is because of the substantial increase in the estimated standard deviation of
barley prices. Perhaps a more useful way to represent the impact of this variable
would be in terms of the percentage impact on output of a change in the standard
deviation of prices. For the case of all farms, the latter coeﬃcient is estimated at
-0.26 in the ﬁrst period and -0.15 for the period 1993 to 1997. This result reﬂects our
ﬁnding that the estimated λ coeﬃcient in our utility function declines substantially
between the ﬁrst and the second period.
In respect of the elasticity of supply response, we observe a substantial increase in
the coeﬃcient between the ﬁrst and second periods. As with the standard-deviation
elasticity, we ﬁnd that the estimates are bigger for smaller-scale farms.
4.5 Distribution of comparative static results
In the previous section we presented key comparative static eﬀects that were eval-
uated at the sample means. These estimates will vary across the sample since  
and σ will vary due to diﬀerences in output in the case of σ and due to output,
production costs and direct payments in the case of  . As we noted in Section 2.3,
the key supply response eﬀects are determined by whether or not the structure of
risk preferences are characterised by DARA or IARA. Thus to illustrate the nature
of the potential diﬀerences that are likely to arise across our sample of farms, we
present in Figures 1 and 2 (insert Figures 1 and 2 here) the distribution of elastic-
ities of S with respect to expected income that are generated from our estimates
based on all farms8 for the two periods of our analysis.
These results indicate that a signiﬁcant proportion of specialist barley producers
exhibit DARA in both periods. However, the percentage of the sample displaying
DARA increases signiﬁcantly from about 24 per cent in the period 1988-92 to 34
per cent in the period 1993-97. As noted already, the shift in risk preferences is
reﬂected in a decline in the mean elasticity, but perhaps the more notable statistic
is the decline in the median value from 0.61 to 0.31.
8The distributions for large and small farms may be obtained from the authors upon request.
175 Concluding Comments
This paper has estimated the risk attitudes of specialist Irish barley producers using
a new mean standard deviation utility (MSU) function over the period 1988-1997.
We split our data analysis into two periods: 1988-92 and 1993-97, which coincide
with introduction of the MacSharry Reforms in 1992.
Our analysis rejects a na¨ ıve speciﬁcation of the ﬁrst and second moments of
expected barley prices that has been used in similar studies. Also, our proposed
MSU function is preferred in our particular application over the traditional Linear
Mean Variance MSU function that is often employed in the agricultural economics
literature.
As to the estimated risk preferences of specialist Irish barley producers, we ﬁnd
a number of interesting results. Irish producers are found to be highly risk averse in
relation to barley prices but the intensity of risk aversion declines appreciably pre
and post the MacSharry 1992 Reforms. We also found that relative large farms (>50
acres) were much less sensitive to risk compared with small farms (<50 acres) in the
ﬁrst period but both groups displayed a similar, and much lower, risk sensitivity in
the period 1993-1997.
Perhaps our most interesting ﬁndings concern the nature of risk preferences
(that is the substitution of expected payoﬀ for risk) in relation to the level of farm
income. We ﬁnd evidence, at the sample means, of increasing absolute risk aversion,
or IARA, for both periods but there is a decline in the IARA elasticity pre and post
reforms. This essential ﬁnding is reﬂected in the elasticities for large and small
farms. The distribution of elasticity values reveals that about a quarter of the
sample exhibit DARA in the ﬁrst period but about a third do so in the second
period. This underlines the apparently signiﬁcant shift in the structure of risk
preferences that we ﬁnd in the period before and after the MacSharry Reforms.
The most important policy implication of our results concerns the ﬁnding of
IARA as this implies that an increase in DPs will lead to a reduction in output,
whereas DARA suggests the opposite eﬀect.
The MacSharry Reforms introduced partially-decoupled direct payments so these
did not constitute a completely risk-free source of income. However, the June 2003
medium-term review (MTR) of the CAP potentially removes any element of risk as-
18sociated with direct payments following the full decoupling of payments from 2005.
Producers will be in receipt of single-farm payments without any production obli-
gation. The receipt by producers of risk-free payments has important implications
for the provision of market-provided risk-management tools such as derivatives or
insurance markets. Studies by Meuwissen et al (1999a) and Meuwissen et al (1999b)
have emphasised the removal of institutionalised income support as a prerequisite
for the successful adoption of these products. Our results may have relevance in
this context.
Finally, the welfare impacts of reform are worth investigating given the impend-
ing budgetary pressures of EU enlargement. Ackrill (2003), for instance, demon-
strates that if the EU is to operate under existing budgetary levels under enlarge-
ment, it may not be able to oﬀer more than 25 per cent of current payment levels to
new member states. The risk-averse nature of most agricultural producers suggests,
that under policy reform, where, prices and incomes may have become more risky,
the receipt of ‘riskless’ direct payments can reduce the cost of risk to producers
relative to what it would have been if the reform had not actually taken place.
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21Table 1: Mean Values of Variables Used in Production System
1988-1992 1993-1997 1988-1997
Variable
  30,701 23,216 30551.9
 p 128 107.9 117.9
σp 1.7 6.9 4.3
q 160.2 133 167.7
x1 29.2 29.3 44.9
x2 96.8 66.9 59.4
x3 227 187 226.8
x4 61.4 55.8 66.7
x5 1.5 1.7 5.5
w1 100.7 112.8 106.7
DP NA 7,618 NA
N 315 205 160
Note: DP is total direct payments per producer. DP,   and  p are in euros with
 p in euros per tonne. q is in tonnes and x4 is in acres. x1 - x3 is in index form
where quantity = total expenditure / relevant input price index. w1 is in index form
with 1990 = 100 and x5 is from a 1-5 index where 1 denotes optimal soil quality.




Preferred Model v CHNPE 96.572* 27.311*
Preferred Model v LMV 160.434* 110.044*
Note: Actual scores are reported, * denotes signiﬁcance at the 1 per cent level.
The Vuong test is normally distributed asymptotically.
23Figure 1: Distribution of Elasticties of ‘S’ with respect to Expected Income on Irish
Specialist Barley Farms, 1988-92
24Figure 2: Distribution of Elasticties of ‘S’ with respect to Expected Income on Irish
Specialist Barley Farms, 1993-97
25Table 3: Production and Risk Parameter Estimates for Specialist Irish Barley Pro-






















Note: Standard errors are in parentheses for coeﬃcient estimates, p-values are
reported for tests. CRS = constant returns to scale, test = Ho : a1 + a2 + a3 = 1,
Dummy variable results (both individual and time) are surpressed but are available,
upon request, from the authors.
26Table 4: Miss-Speciﬁcation Tests for Estimated Equations
1988-1992 1993-1997
Heteroscedasticity
Equation 18(i) 0.105 0.189
Equation 18(ii) 0.447 0.326
Equation 18(iii) 0.203 0.098
Autocorrelation
Equation 18(i) 0.131 0.215
Equation 18(ii) 0.644 0.426
Equation 18(iii) 0.148 0.112
Note: P-values are reported for the heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation tests.
Both tests for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation are χ2 tests.
27Table 5: Production and Risk Parameter Estimates for Specialist Irish Barley Pro-
ducers Assuming Rational Price Expectations
1988-1992 1993-1997
(< 50 acres) (> 50 acres) (< 50 acres) (> 50 acres)
Parameter
a0 1.185 1.272 0.932 0.694
(0.267) (0.363) (0.255) (0.251)
a1 0.404 0.389 0.562 0.537
(0.027) (0.031) (0.055) (0.044)
a2 -0.094 -0.093 -0.132 -0.116
(0.007) (0.008) (0.012) (0.008)
a3 0.319 0.339 0.393 0.371
(0.041) (0.037) (0.051) (0.058)
a4 0.481 0.485 0.539 0.474
(0.041) (0.050) (0.539) (0.474)
a5 0.271 0.222 0.625 0.156
(0.089) (0.062) (0.279) (0.032)
Risk
λ 42084.3 22850.9 1197.1 1187.7
(4719.5) (3376.3) (223.36) (206.76)
Tests
CRS 42.354 15.185 28.789 35.775
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
N 155 160 100 105
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses for coeﬃcient estimates, p-values are
reported for tests. CRS = constant returns to scale, test = Ho : a1 + a2 + a3 = 1,
Dummy variable results (both individual and time) are surpressed but are available,
upon request, from the authors.
28Table 6: Elasticities Estimated at the Sample Mean
All farms Small farms Large farms
(< 50 acres) (> 50 acres)
S wrt  
1988-92 0.44 0.36 0.36
1993-97 0.27 0.30 0.30
Output wrt expected DPs
1988-92 0.00 0.00 0.00
1993-97 -0.13 -0.19 -0.15
Output wrt expected σp
1988-92 -0.44 -0.68 -0.44
1993-97 -1.07 -1.26 -1.11
Output wrt expected  p
1988-92 0.49 0.64 0.55
1993-97 1.19 1.38 1.22
Note: DPs are direct payments and wrt is “with respect to”.
29